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To become skilled artifact users, children must learn the actions and functions associated 
with artifacts.  We investigated preschoolers’ ability to fast-map an action, function and name 
associated with a novel artifact and retain the new mapping long-term, following brief 
incidental exposure to the artifact’s use.  In Experiment 1, 3-and 5-year-olds were tested one 
week after two exposures to a novel action, function and name (n=144).  Participants 
performed well on comprehension tests of all three kinds of information.  In Experiment 2, 
3-year-olds (n=100) were exposed to these three kinds of information only once.  Retention 
of the action-artifact link was above chance levels, while that for function and the name were 
not. Finally, in Experiment 3, 4-year-olds (n=128) performed well on an action production 
task, a week after brief exposure.  In contrast, their performance on a name production task 
immediately after exposure was poor.  Our data suggest that preschool children can retain 
function information about a novel artifact from brief exposure, similar to their ability to 
learn an artifact name.  Crucially, their ability to remember an action-artifact mapping is 
markedly better than functions and names. 
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Following Carey and Bartlett’s (1978) introduction of the concept of ‘fast mapping’ 
and Markson and Bloom’s (1997) demonstration of the long-term retention of fast-mapped 
object names and facts, there has been renewed interest in what kinds of information are 
learnt from limited exposure (e.g., Casler, 2014; Deák & Toney, 2013; Holland, Simpson & 
Riggs, 2015; Horst & Samuelson, 2008; Riggs, Mather, Hyde & Simpson 2015; Vlach & 
Sandhofer, 2012).  Fast mapping describes the learning that takes place from brief exposure 
(one or a few exposures) to novel information about an object.  It would seem that some 
words (e.g., object names) and some other kinds of information (e.g., actions made with 
objects) can be retained long term by young children (2-4yrs) following brief exposure, at 
least under certain circumstances.  Most recently, Riggs and colleagues (2015) compared 
fast mapping and retention of actions and object names, introducing preschool children to 
either a novel word that named a novel object, or a novel action employed to use the novel 
object.  A week later, children recognized the target object linked with the novel action at 
above chance levels and their comprehension of the object-action link was as good as their 
comprehension of the object-name link. 
The current research investigated the fast mapping of the functions associated with 
artifacts (i.e., manufactured objects), in addition to actions and names.  The function of an 
artifact is the effect it has when used (e.g., slicing is the function of a knife), and is encoded 
conceptually. In contrast, all actions are the product of sensorimotor representations.  
Although many actions do not utilize objects (e.g., dancing), artifact use usually combines a 
specific action with a specific artifact.  When encoding the action made with an artifact, the 
sensorimotor representation formed must incorporate both the action made by the body and 
the artifact on which the body acts.  A specific action-artifact combination brings about a 
specific effect.  This is often a change to an object or a substance, which we refer to here as 
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the artifact’s ‘substrate’.  For example, when a hammer (the artifact) is used, it is grasped by 
its handle with the head oriented away from the body, and the arm and wrist are moved in 
such a way (the artifact’s action) as to bring the head of the hammer into contact with a nail 
on a surface (the artifact’s substrate).  This contact drives the nail into that surface (the 
artifact’s function). 
Our definition of artifact function is consistent with that of previous theorists (e.g., 
Bloom, 1996; Kelemen, 1999; Kemler Nelson, Frankenfield, Morris & Blair, 2000).  Like 
these theorists, we propose that an artifact’s function is encoded in a conceptual 
representation that encompasses what it means to use the artifact (e.g., a knife slices bread 
when used).  A considerable amount of previous research has investigated the ‘richness’ of 
young children’s conceptual understanding of artifact function.  For example, do children 
conceptualize an artifact’s function as reflecting the intention of the specific person who 
originally designed it (e.g., Jaswal, 2006)?  In contrast, we focus on the basic understanding 
that the function of an artifact reflects the effect it has when used. This basic understanding of 
function (in combination with the necessary sensorimotor representation) is sufficient to use 
most artifacts. 
The actions and functions associated with an artifact’s use are of particular interest 
when investigating the scope of fast mapping for two reasons.  First, artifact use has a central 
role in human behavior.  As with language, skilled artifact use separates humans from the rest 
of the animal kingdom.  In comparison to other animals, even other primates, we use a 
staggering number of sophisticated artifacts, each with a dedicated function (Casler and 
Kelemen, 2005).  Fast mapping could facilitate children’s acquisition of the knowledge 
needed to use them.  Indeed, their ability to fast map this knowledge could help explain, in 
part, why humans’ use of artifacts so greatly exceeds that of other animals. 
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Second, the order in which children learn artifact-action and artifact-function 
associations is relevant to a fundamental question about the nature of children’s learning. 
Embodied cognition suggests that conceptual knowledge develops from motor behavior (e.g., 
Marshall, 2016; Piaget & Inhelder, 1969; Shapiro, 2011). From this perspective, young 
children’s artifact knowledge will be built on sensorimotor representations formed from the 
actions made with them.  There is considerable evidence to suggest that actions are central to 
the artifact representations of adults (e.g., Beauchamp & Martin, 2007; van Elk, van Schie & 
Bekkering, 2009), but this account of artifact representation has received less attention in the 
developmental literature (although see Hahn & Gershkoff-Stowe, 2010).  In contrast, the 
developmental literature has focused on the role of function knowledge in defining artifact 
categories.  This research suggests that children think of artifacts as being created for a 
specific purpose and categorize them accordingly (e.g., Bloom, 2004; Casler & Kelemen, 
2005; Jaswal, 2006).  While children may recognize the importance of an artifact’s function 
from an early age, this does not preclude the possibility that they first learn the action 
associated with it. 
We investigated what children fast map and retain when they observe a novel artifact 
being used under conditions of brief and incidental exposure.  There are a number of 
possibilities.  Do children form a mental representation with no motor component?  Children 
could form a simple perceptual association between the artifact and its substrate.  For 
example, they could learn to associate a hammer with a nail, without any information 
concerning how to act on them or what this action will achieve.  Alternatively, children could 
form a more sophisticated conceptual representation, which links the artifact and its function 
(e.g., the hammer is used to fix the nail to the wall).  A third possibility is that learning is 
exclusively sensorimotor, integrating only the action and the artifact (e.g., how to grip and 
swing a hammer), or perhaps incorporating the substrate as well (e.g., how to grip and swing 
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the hammer so that it strikes the nail).  Children may learn any number of these pieces of 
information, or indeed other information, integrated in any combination. 
What does the literature tell us about what children learn from their first encounter with 
a novel artifact’s use?  While it provides evidence that they learn something, it does not 
clearly demonstrate what that something is.  Previous studies have investigated either action 
learning or function learning, but not both.  Riggs and colleagues (2015) provide evidence 
that 3- and 4-year-olds can fast map an action (rubbing the left arm with a novel object held 
in the right hand) and retain it long term.  They did not test function learning, and in fact 
argued that the action was ‘functionless’, as it did not have any obvious effect (Riggs et al, 
2015, p.6).  Using similar actions, Childers and Tomasello (2002) found evidence for action 
learning (in 2-year-olds) and suggested that these actions did have a function but did not test 
function separately. In contrast, Casler and Kelemen (2005) investigated the long-term 
retention of function, and obtained some evidence for learning in 2-, 3-, 4- and 5-year-olds.  
However, their study did not report action learning, even though actions were incorporated 
into the exposure session, and children were encouraged to produce them.   
That no study has simultaneously tested both action and function learning would be of 
little concern if these studies clearly distinguished them (i.e., one showed that action was 
learnt and another that function was learnt).  However, we suggest that the way learning has 
been tested in these three studies makes it difficult to be sure what was learnt.  When testing 
learning, children were given the choice of two or more artifacts, and were asked to identify 
which one was associated with the novel action or function.  It is unclear what children had 
learnt when they responded correctly on these tests of comprehension.  Their good 
performance could have been due to a memory linking the artifact and its substrate (a 
perceptual representation), or a memory of the artifact and its associated function (a 
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conceptual representation), or a memory of the artifact and its associated action (a 
sensorimotor representation).    
For example, in the study by Riggs et al. (2015) children were asked, “Which one do 
we do this with?” while the experimenter performed the action.  Children could have selected 
the appropriate artifact by remembering the artifact-action association.  Alternatively, they 
could have remembered the artifact-function association: remembering the target as an ‘arm-
scratcher’.  When asked “Which one do we do this with?” they could select the target artifact, 
because the action the experimenter performed was the one you would make with an arm 
scratcher. Finally, they could have remembered the artifact-substrate association (e.g., target 
artifact-arm):  that is neither the action nor the function.  They could then assume that the 
experimenter must be referring to the target artifact, because this artifact was associated with 
an arm. In this way, it was possible for children to pass the Riggs et al. (2015) ‘action’ 
comprehension test by remembering the action or the function or the substrate associated 
with the target artifact. 
Our purpose for the present study was to determine what preschoolers do fast map and 
retain when they observe an artifact being used for the first time.  This age group were tested 
to match previous research (e.g., Casler & Kelemen, 2005; Holland et. al., 2015; Riggs et. al., 
2015).  Specific procedures were employed to ensure that correct responses in tests of 
comprehension could distinguish between an artifact-action association and an artifact-
function association and, in addition, rule out an artifact-substrate association.   The first two 
experiments compared preschoolers’ ability to retain an action, function and object name 
(word), after a significant time delay, following brief and incidental exposure.  The first 
experiment provided children with two exposures to the novel action, function and name.  
The second experiment reduced the number of exposures to just one.  These experiments 
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tested children’s comprehension.  The third experiment compared retention for actions and 
words only, but investigated production as well as comprehension.   
Experiment 1 
In order to investigate what children fast map and retain when they observe an artifact 
being used for the first time, we introduced preschool children to a novel artifact, word, 
action, substrate and function.  In the exposure session, the target novel artifact was named 
and was used with a specific arcing action (the artifact’s action) on top of a music box (the 
artifact’s substrate) which appeared to cause music to play (the artifact’s function).  This task 
was designed to ensure that passing a comprehension question about a specific kind of 
artifact knowledge was only possible if that specific knowledge was remembered.  As is 
usually the case, the name (‘koba’) was unrelated to the action and function.  In addition, the 
artifact-action could not be inferred from a memory of its function, and its function could not 
be inferred from a memory of the action.  Another important feature of the procedure was 
that when the comprehension question was asked, the substrate (the box) was not in sight.  
This ensured that children could not answer correctly based on some perceptual memory of 
the association between the artifact and substrate alone.   
We presented the novel artifact being used in an incidental context.  Learning about its 
use was not the stated goal of the experimenter-child interaction.  The experimenter said that 
they were ‘teaching’ a puppet about colors and shapes. The puppet requested that the 
experimenter use the artifact: a request that the child observed.  Some authors regard 
incidental learning as an essential feature of fast mapping (e.g., Markson & Bloom, 1997) 
and others do not (e.g., Deák & Toney, 2013).  Unlike previous research which has 
investigated artifact-use (e.g., Casler & Kelemen, 2005; Childers and Tomasello, 2002; Riggs 
et al., 2015), we assessed incidental learning to provide a stringent test of young children’s 
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fast mapping ability.  It is likely that this reflects children’s real-world exposure to artifacts in 
many situations: they are ‘incidentally present’ when the artifact is used.   
In Experiment 1 we tested 3- to 5-year-olds: reflecting the age groups tested in the 
literature to date (excluding referent selection studies).   They received two incidental 
demonstrations of the action, function and name associated with a novel artifact.  Children’s 
knowledge of either the action-artifact, function-artifact or word-artifact mapping was then 
assessed with a comprehension test presented either immediately or after one week. Word 
retention, the traditional focus for fast mapping studies, was tested for comparison purposes. 
Method 
Participants  
One hundred and forty-four children (24 per condition) were tested who attended a 
nursery or infant school in an outer-city borough of London, England (mean age=4,5; age 
range 3,1 to 5,6; 69 girls).  All children spoke English as a first language and none were 
reported as having any behavioral or learning difficulties. The sample was predominantly 
white and of mixed social background. 
Design 
A between-participants design was used with factors of Time Interval (Immediate, 
Delay) and Knowledge Type (Action, Function, Word).  The dependent variable was 
comprehension accuracy - picking the target item from an array of four artifacts. 
Stimuli 
The stimuli comprised a ginger cat hand puppet called Mittens (See Fig. 1a), four novel 
artifacts and a music box (a white cube containing a concealed audio speaker, 13 x 14 x 
25cm).  The novel artifacts were a yellow four-way radiator key, a green disc shaped air-vent 
cover, a red trapezium-shaped plastering tool, and a blue tumble dryer ball – all between 6 
and 9 cm in size.  There were also four black and white photographs of these artifacts for the 
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shape-matching game (See Fig. 1b) and four colored pieces of card (yellow, green, red and 
blue) for the color-matching game.  The Music Box appeared to play a tune when the novel 
action was performed on it with the target novel artifact (it was actually activated by the 
experimenter using a concealed foot pedal).  The music was a 20-second sound clip from a 
popular children’s television program. 
Figure 1. Stimuli and Materials 
 
Procedure 
Ethical approval was granted by the ethics committee of the University of Essex for all 
experiments.  Informed consent was obtained from all the parents of the children who 
participated.  Testing took place, one on one, in a separate room near the child’s classroom.   
The task was designed to ensure that the action, function and word (object label) associated 
with the target artifact were introduced in an incidental context.  The focus of the task from 
the participant’s perspective was to help teach a puppet called ‘Mittens’ about shapes and 
colors.  The experimental task was sandwiched between two distracter tasks.  These distracter 
tasks also ensured that each participant focused on each of the four novel artifacts for roughly 
equal amounts of time. 
Fig. 1a – Mittens, the puppet 
 
Fig. 1b – four novel artifacts: radiator key,  
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The experimental session started with the experimenter passing the child a box 
containing the four novel artifacts described above and asking her/him to put the contents on 
the table.  Then the experimenter and child played a shape-matching game, the first of two 
distracter tasks.  In this game, children were asked to help Mittens learn his shapes by 
matching the artifacts to the black and white photographs (see Fig. 1b).  Next, Mittens 
appeared to whisper in the experimenter’s ear.  The experimenter then said, “OK, but we’ll 
have to use the koba” whilst selecting the target artifact (counterbalancing the four artifacts 
across participants).  The experimenter demonstrated a specific action with the target object – 
holding it in thumb and forefinger and moving it along the top of the Music Box in three 
arcing motions, touching the surface of the Music Box each time.  The action needed to be 
sufficiently complex (comprising 3 arcs and 3 contacts with the substrate) so that observers 
would interpret the action as meaningful (i.e. used in conjunction with the artifact to cause 
music to play), rather than just a random movement on the part of the Experimenter such as a 
hand-wave.  For brevity, this action will be referred to as “arc” or “arcing” from now on.  At 
the end of this action, and unseen by the child, the experimenter pressed a foot pedal that 
activated the music.  Mittens then ‘whispered’ in the experimenter’s ear once again and the 
experimenter said, “OK, but this is the last time.  We have lots to do. We have to use the 
koba”, thereby repeating the novel word and the experimenter demonstrated the action (3 arcs 
and 3 contacts) and function once more.   The Music Box was then placed on the floor under 
the table, removing the substrate from view.  The demonstration phase was completed with 
the color matching game, the second distracter task.  Children were asked to help Mittens 
match the artifacts to cards of the same color. 
In the Immediate condition, the test phase followed the color matching game, which 
took approximately 5 minutes.  In the Delay condition, children were tested 6-7 days later 
and, just prior to the test phase, the Experimenter said “Hi! We met a week ago.  I’m going to 
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ask you a question about what we did”.  In the test phase in both the Immediate and Delay 
conditions, children were presented with the four novel artifacts from the demonstration 
phase.  Participants were asked one of three questions according to condition: (1) Action 
condition, “Which one do we do this with?”, whilst the experimenter demonstrated the action 
(using a neutral hand position so as not to indicate which of the four objects was the target); 
(2) Function condition, “Which one starts the music playing?”; (3) Word condition, “Which 
one is the koba?”. 
Results and Discussion 
Children were assessed either immediately or after a delay of one week on retention of 
the novel word-artifact, action-artifact or function-artifact mapping.  Comprehension 
accuracy was uniformly high, ranging from 75%-88% across all knowledge types and both 
time intervals (Fig. 2).  Log-Linear Analysis revealed no significant effects involving gender 
(p=.61) or age (p=.29).  The chance of selecting the correct target at test was 25% (1 of 4 
novel objects) and binomial comparisons demonstrated that performance was significantly 
above chance in all of the Knowledge Type and Time Interval conditions (p<.001). 
With a between-participants design and more than two categorical variables, a Log-
Linear Analysis is the appropriate statistical test.  Categorical data can be expressed in the 
form of a linear model using log values.  When data are categorical and all the main effects 
and interactions are included, the model is saturated i.e. there is no error.  Log-Linear 
Analysis tries to fit a simpler model to the data, without any significant loss of predictive 
power.  It works on the principle of backward elimination and does so hierarchically.  
Starting with the highest-order interaction, interactions are removed one by one until 
removing an interaction (or main effect) has a significant effect on the fit of the model.  A 
three-way log–linear analysis (Time Delay, Knowledge Type and Comprehension Accuracy) 
produced a final model that did not retain any significant main effects or interactions 
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(p≥0.74).  The likelihood ratio of this model was χ2 (10)=1.34, p=0.999, the non-significant 
finding indicating that the model was a good fit of the data.  
Figure 2. Experiment 1 - Comprehension accuracy for actions, functions and words, 
following two incidental exposures, immediately and after one week.  
 
  
The purpose of this experiment was to investigate what children fast map and retain 
when they incidentally observe an artifact being used for the first time under brief exposure 
conditions.  We compared preschoolers learning of action-artifact, function-artifact and 
word-artifact mappings.  Our data suggest that young children can fast map actions and 
functions as well as words.   Observing an adult naming and using an artifact only twice was 
sufficient for preschoolers to pass a test of action, function or word comprehension one week 
later. 
Looking at the literature, long-term word retention varies across fast mapping studies.  
For example, Markson and Bloom (1997), Waxman and Booth (2000) and 
Holland et. al. (2015) evidence retention of object names significantly above chance at least a 
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failed to evidence any long-term retention of color, shape or texture words).  In contrast, 
Horst and Samuelson (2008, Study 1C) and Vlach and Sandhofer (2012) found that 
preschoolers struggled to retain a single object name from brief exposure.  Given this 
variation, there was no certainty that children would remember the novel word after one week 
with our new task.  With only two incidental exposures and no obvious aids to retention (see 
Vlach & Sandhofer, 2012, for a discussion of this), it is impressive how good the rate of word 
retention was.  Perhaps, children pay particular attention when they see a novel artifact being 
used (see General Discussion). 
Two concerns from this experiment were addressed in Experiment 2.  First, there were 
no differences between the Knowledge Type conditions.  It was impressive that performance 
was good for all three types of knowledge, however this ceiling performance tells us nothing 
about whether children find one knowledge type easier to learn than another.  Second, only 
one substrate and one function was used.  Perhaps children performed well in Experiment 1, 
because the Music Box or the playing of music were particularly salient. 
Experiment 2 
In order to distinguish between children’s ability to fast map and retain actions, 
functions and words, a more challenging test of learning was employed.  In previous fast 
mapping research, Markson and Bloom (1997) observed much better word retention than 
Vlach and Sandhofer (2012), despite using almost identical procedures.  The principal 
difference was in the number of times participants were exposed to the novel words: three 
times in Markson & Bloom’s study and once in Vlach & Sandhofer’s.  Based on these 
findings we reduced the number of exposures to just one.  In addition, to test whether 
learning generalized to other substrates and functions, half the participants were tested with a 
different substrate and function.   Three-year-olds were tested on their action, function or 
words knowledge after a delay of one week. 





 Sixty 3-year-olds (20 per condition) participated in the experiment (mean age=3,6; age 
range 3,1 to 3,11; 25 girls).  All the children attended a nursery or infant school in the county 
of Essex, England.  All children spoke English as a first language, and none were reported as 
having any behavioral or learning difficulties. The sample was predominantly white and of 
mixed social background. 
Design 
A between-participants design was used with Knowledge Type (Function, Action, 
Word) and Substrate (Music-Box, Drawer-Box) as the factor.  The dependent variable was 
accuracy. 
Stimuli 
The stimuli from Experiment 1 were used for the Music-Box condition.  The Drawer-
Box condition used Mittens and the same novel artifact array as Experiment 1 but the 
substrate differed.  It was the same size as the Music-Box but contained a motorised drawer 
and, like the Music-Box, was operated by a foot pedal.  The Drawer box contained a plastic 
necklace. 
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to Experiment 1 except that the novel object was labelled 
only once and the action and function were demonstrated only once.  As before, Mittens 
whispered to the experimenter following the initial demonstration, but this time the 
experimenter said, “No, we can’t do it again, we have lots to do!” and placed the Music box 
or the Drawer box on the floor under the table.  The Drawer-Box condition was very similar 
to the Music-Box condition.  On selecting the target artifact, the experimenter said, “OK but 
we need to use the Koba” and demonstrated a specific action with it (three arcs moving along 
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the top of the Drawer-Box).  At the end of this action the experimenter pressed a foot pedal, 
unseen by the child, that opened the drawer.  The experimenter took a necklace from it, 
which she placed around Mitten’s neck.   
All children were tested 6-7 days after the initial exposure.  During the testing session, 
with the original four novel artifacts on display (not the substrate), children were asked one 
of three questions: “Which one is the Koba?” (Word condition), “Which one do we do this 
with?” (Action condition) whilst the Experimenter mimed the action or “Which one starts the 
music playing/opens the drawer?” (Function condition). 
Results and Discussion 
Children were assessed after one week on retention of the novel action-artifact, 
function-artifact and word-artifact mappings.  Comprehension accuracy was good for the 
action-artifact mapping (65%), but poor with the other two mappings (30% and 15% - See 
Fig. 3).  Binominal comparisons revealed that action-artifact mappings were retained 
significantly above chance (p<.001).  In contrast, performance did not differ from chance in 
the Function (p=0.383) or Word (p=0.909) conditions. 
A hierarchical three-way log–linear analysis (Knowledge Type, Substrate and 
Comprehension Accuracy) produced a final model that retained one of the two-way 
interactions:  Knowledge Type x Comprehension Accuracy.  The likelihood ratio of this 
model was not significant (χ2 (6)=4.689, p=.584) indicating that the model was a good fit of 
the data.  The Substrate x Accuracy interaction was not significant (p=0.283) so 
Comprehension accuracy performance was not affected by whether children were 
demonstrated an action with the Music-Box or Drawer-Box.  
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Figure 3. Experiment 2 - Comprehension accuracy for actions, functions and words, 
following a single incidental exposure, after one week.  
 
  
Consistent with the log–linear analysis, chi-square analysis revealed that Knowledge 
Type did affect Comprehension Accuracy, χ2(2)=11.6, p=.003.  Individual chi-squares 
compared performance in the action condition to the function and the word conditions, 
respectively.  Both comparisons were significant: action-function χ2(1)=4.91, p=.027 (odds 
ratio 4.3) and action-word χ2(1)=10.4, p=.001 (odds ratio 10.3).  Thus, the data suggest that 
children, from just one incidental exposure, were four times more likely to retain the newly 
learned action than the function, and 10 times more likely to retain the newly learned action 
than the word. 
In Experiment 1 with two exposures, performance across the three knowledge types 
was indistinguishable.  In Experiment 2, however, using a more challenging test of learning 
with just one exposure, comprehension accuracy fell to chance levels for words and 
functions.  Comprehension accuracy in the Action condition was significantly above chance 
levels, and significantly higher than in the Function and Word conditions. These results 
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they do a function-artifact mapping or a word-artifact mapping.  Why this might be the case 
is considered in the General Discussion.  Finally, the results provide no evidence that the 
nature of the substrate and function affect comprehension accuracy – there were no 
significant differences in retention between the Music-Box and Drawer-Box tasks.   
It could be argued that function learning and action learning were not clearly 
differentiated in Experiment 2.  In general, on seeing the action, participants may assume that 
it is the physical action and not the use of the specific novel artifact that caused the box to 
play music or drawer to open.  For example, when switching on a computer I may use my 
finger, or a pen or a number of different objects to press the button – it is the action of 
pressing the button that is paramount.  In Experiment 1 the act of repeating the exposure may 
have helped to fix the idea that the target artifact needs to be used, because it was employed 
on both occasions. However, just before initiating the action with the target artifact, the 
Experimenter said, “OK, but we’ll have to use the koba”, indicating that it was the specific 
‘tool’ needed to turn on the music/open the drawer.   
A question arising from these results is how substantial the action-artifact mapping 
advantage is.  Our next experiment addressed this question by investigating how well 
preschoolers could reproduce an action, following brief exposure and a significant time 
delay.  
Experiment 3 
The results from Experiment 2 suggest that pre-schoolers’ action-artifact mappings, 
created from brief exposure, are more robust than word-artifact and function-artifact 
mappings formed under identical conditions.  However, both Experiment 1 and 2 only tested 
comprehension.  An obvious question is how robust are these mappings?  Production is a 
much more stringent test of fast mapping, especially as children find word production 
notoriously difficult in comparison to comprehension (e.g., Carey & Bartlett, 1978; Childers 
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& Tomasello, 2002; Dollaghan, 1985; Fenson & colleagues, 1993; Gershkoff-Stowe & Hahn, 
2013; Hahn & Gershkoff-Stowe, 2010; Heibeck & Markman, 1987).  Indeed, for words, 
learning sufficient for production does not seem to be possible in a fast mapping context, 
especially after a delay.  
For example, Hahn and Gershkoff-Stowe (2010) have previously investigated 
children’s learning of word-artifact and action-artifact mappings.  They exposed 
2- and 3-year-olds to either four novel word-artifacts mappings or four novel action-object 
mappings, each presented approximately six times in an explicit context (i.e. learning the 
words and actions was clearly the focus of the experiment-child interaction). Participants 
were tested for receptive (comprehension) and productive knowledge immediately after 
training.  Word production was minimal (8%-16%).  In contrast, action production was 
impressive (75%-95%).  However, Hahn and Gershkoff-Stowe (2010) did not test after any 
kind of delay, and exposure was neither brief nor incidental.   
Childers and Tomasello (2002) tested 2-½-year-olds’ production of either words or 
actions following a significant delay and found that actions (69%) were reproduced 
significantly more than words (39%).  However, each participant was tested in all three time 
delays (immediate, one day, one week later) and each child experienced either four or eight 
exposures of explicit naming.  Similarly, Gershkoff-Stowe and Hahn’s study (2013) also 
involved repeated testing and numerous exposures to explicit naming.  Horst and Samuelson 
(2008) demonstrated that ostensive naming can have a significant effect on word recognition 
compared to implicit (follow-in) labelling.  We wanted to investigate whether good action 
production would persist under incidental and brief exposure conditions after a week’s delay.  
If so, this would demonstrate a considerable advantage in action learning over word learning.   
It is not possible to test function production separately from action production.  Action 
production is transparent.  If the child produces the action in response to the question “Can 
FAST MAPPING AND RETENTION OF FUNCTIONS AND ACTIONS    
 
20
you show me what to do with this?”, we can be sure the action has been mapped and retained 
accurately.  This is not true for function however.  If the child is asked “What is this for?” 
and demonstrates the action, we cannot be sure that the function has been mapped. Children 
may interpret the question “What is this for?” as a request to produce the action.  They may 
have no expectation as to whether that action will produce the function.  Alternatively, 
children could be asked to describe the function verbally, but their ability to do so could be 
limited by their verbal skills. Poor performance would not necessarily demonstrate poor 
function knowledge.  Consequently, only action production was tested here, along with word 
production as a comparison.   
This final experiment compared action and word comprehension and production in 4-
year-olds, following two incidental exposures, tested either immediately or after one week.  
Using the fast mapping task from Experiment 1 we expected to replicate the good action and 
word comprehension across both time intervals.  In addition, we predicted poor word 
production in line with the literature.  Given previous action production data (Childers & 
Tomasello, 2002; Hahn & Gershkoff-Stowe, 2010) and the robustness of the action-artifact 
mapping indicated in Experiment 2, we predicted good action production in the immediate 
condition (when testing occurred soon after the exposure session).  However, it was not clear 
whether 4-year-olds would produce actions following brief incidental exposure and a week’s 
delay between exposure and test.  
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and twenty-eight 4-year-olds (16 per condition) participated in the 
experiment (mean age=4,7; age range 4,0-4,11; 59 girls).  All the children attended a nursery 
or infant school in an outer-city borough of London, England. 




A between-participants design was used with factors of Time Interval (Immediate, 
Delay) and Knowledge Type (Action, Word).  The dependent variable was accuracy: the 
number of children who selected the target artifact for the comprehension tasks, and who 
produced the correct action or word for the production tasks. 
Stimuli 
The materials were the same as those used in Experiment 1.   
Procedure 
The distracter tasks, experimental demonstration phase and comprehension tests 
followed the same procedure as Experiment 1.  In the test of production, participants were 
asked to produce either the novel action or the novel word.  The production test presented the 
music-box (in contrast to the test of comprehension) and the child was asked to demonstrate 
the target artifact’s use (“Can you show me what to do with this?”) or to name this artifact 
(“What is this called, what is its name?”).  Pilot data showed that children would act on and 
name familiar artifacts in response to these production questions, and that it was possible for 
the experimenter to record the child’s response accurately (as with the comprehension test). 
Most children produced either the modeled behavior (action or name) or no response at all. In 
order be scored as correct, children had to produce the complete action (three and only three 
in-line arcs on the upper surface of the music box) or the complete word (all four phonemes 
of “koba” in the correct order).  Any partial performance was also noted. 
Results and Discussion 
As expected, comprehension scores were impressive (81%-87%) in both time intervals 
and for both Knowledge Types with two exposures to the novel word or action (see Figure 4), 
replicating Experiment 1’s results.  Binomial comparisons to chance (25%) were significantly 
above chance in all the Knowledge Type and Time Interval conditions (p<.001).  There were 
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no significant effects involving gender (p=.50).  An hierarchical three-way log-linear analysis 
(Time Delay, Knowledge Type and Comprehension Accuracy) produced a final model that 
did not retain any significant main effects or interactions (p≥0.72).  The likelihood ratio of 
this model was χ2 (6)=0.368, p=0.999, indicating that the model was a good fit of the data.  
Thus, there were no significant differences in comprehension accuracy between the two time 
intervals and neither was there any significant difference in accuracy across Knowledge 
Types.  Word comprehension was as good as action comprehension.   
Figure 4. Experiment 3 - Comprehension and production accuracy for actions and words, 
following two incidental exposures, immediately and after one week. 
 
 
The production data profile differed.  Production scores for actions were high across 
both time intervals (75%-94%).  In contrast, word production was poor - immediately after 
exposure as well as one week later (0%-6%).  There were no significant effects involving 
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A hierarchical three-way log–linear analysis (Knowledge Type, Time Interval and 
Accuracy) produced a final model that retained one of the two-way interactions:  Knowledge 
Type x Accuracy.  The likelihood ratio of this model was χ2 (4)=3.68, p=.45, indicating that 
the model was a good fit of the data.  Although there were no significant differences in 
production across Time Interval for action or word production, there were significant 
differences across Knowledge Type (χ2 (1)=51.08, p<.001).  Action production was 
significantly better than word production.  The odds ratio indicated that the likelihood of 
children producing the newly learned action was 169 times more likely than producing a 
word. 
In addition to correct performance, it is also informative to consider partial 
performance.  As noted in the procedure section for the pilot data, children who did not 
produce the correct response to production question tended not to respond at all.  For the 
action production question (across the Immediate and Week Delay conditions), five children 
did not respond correctly.  Three made no response, one tapped the music box with the 
artifact once on the side, and one described its function verbally.  Of the 31 failures to say 
“koba” in the Word condition across both time delays (n=32), 19 did not respond at all, 5 
produced real words which were verbal descriptions of the target artifact’s appearance (e.g. 
‘ball’), 2 produced non-words containing none of the target phonemes, and 5 produced non-
words containing some of the target phonemes.  Thus, there were more partially correct 
responses in the word condition. Nonetheless, even if all the partially correct non-words were 
treated as correct, this only gives five correct words versus 27 correct actions. 
This is the first experiment to test children’s production of novel actions following two 
incidental exposures and a testing delay of one week.  Three-quarters of preschoolers could 
reproduce the action with the appropriate target object in the week delay condition, imitating 
all three arcs across the top of the music box.  This suggests that children’s initial action-
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artifact mapping is strong and stable.  In addition, the action-artifact mapping seems to be far 
more robust than the word-artifact mapping: of the 16 children in the delay condition, only 
one produced a non-word with any correct phonemes (“quata”, the same final phoneme as 
“koba”).  
General Discussion 
We investigated what preschool children fast map and retain when a novel artifact is 
named and used for the first time. Comprehension of novel action, function and word 
mappings was tested following a substantial time delay of one week.  Over three 
experiments, the number of exposures was varied and production, as well as comprehension, 
was tested.  With two exposures in Experiment 1, comprehension was significantly above 
chance and similar for all three knowledge types (actions, functions and words).  When the 
number of exposures was reduced to just one, preschoolers only retained action-artifact 
mappings at above chance levels.  Finally, using a test of production, the superiority of the 
action-artifact mapping was further emphasized as three-quarters of children (12 of 16) 
reproduced the novel action with the appropriate artifact after one week.  In contrast, not one 
child produced the novel word after a week’s delay (only one produced it in the immediate 
condition).  
Methodological considerations 
Before interpreting our data, a number of methodological considerations need to be 
addressed.  First, it could be argued that selection of the target artifact reflected that the target 
object was treated differently from the other artifacts, rather than good memory for artifact-
information mappings (word, action or function).  Indeed, it was the only the target artifact 
that was named and acted upon during the exposure session.  In the word learning literature, 
it has been suggested that naming an artifact makes it different or more salient and, therefore, 
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more likely to be selected in a comprehension test, despite no word-artifact mapping having 
been formed (Axelsson & Horst, 2013; Baldwin & Markman, 1989). 
In our task, however, the experimenter and child interacted extensively with all four 
novel artifacts.  In comparison, the demonstration of the target artifact’s use was relatively 
brief, and not directed towards the child.  Moreover, there is evidence that whether or not the 
target artifact is named during the exposure session has no effect on its subsequent selection 
in a comprehension task (Hyde, 2016).  Hyde’s findings are clearly inconsistent with the 
proposal that naming the target object makes it different or more salient and leads to its 
selection at test.  Axelsson and Horst (2013) acknowledge that introducing children to just 
one word is a sensible procedure when exploring what, if anything, children learn from very 
brief exposure, as we do in the current studies.   Finally, the difference or salience 
explanation cannot explain why action comprehension was better than function and word 
comprehension (in Experiment 2); nor indeed can it explain why action production was even 
possible (in Experiment 3).  Our data across all three experiments strongly suggest that 
children are remembering specific pieces of information about the target artifact. 
Another methodological concern relates to the novelty of the three types of knowledge.  
Were the actions and the functions used really as novel as the novel word?  ‘Koba” is a novel 
word which participants would not have experienced before, but it could be argued that the 
bouncing action and the function of making music play (or opening a drawer) were not novel 
to the same extent.  However, the non-word “koba” uses a combination of familiar phonemes, 
just as the action combines familiar sub-actions (e.g., grasping an object and a ‘bouncing’ 
motion) to make the novel action sequence.  Likewise, music playing is not novel but using 
the target artifact to act upon a white box (substrate) to produce music is.  Certainly, the 
novelty of the actions and functions in this study were similar to those used in previous 
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research (e.g. rolling a novel artifact object on your knee, Childers and Tomasello, 2002; or 
the function of crushing a cracker, Casler, 2014). 
Another concern is that functions are intrinsically harder to learn than actions and 
words.  Unlike actions and words, functions cannot be perceived directly during incidental 
observation.  Functions must always be inferred: the observer must make the link between the 
action-artifact combination and the outcome achieved, in order to infer the artifact’s function.  
While recognizing the necessity of having to make an inference, we made the outcomes 
themselves as easy to perceive as possible (e.g. making music play and opening a drawer).  
By presenting a very simple observable outcome, we had no reason to suppose that children 
would be unable to learn the artifact-function mapping as easily as the word or action 
mappings.  Thus, we think it unlikely that we have underestimated children’s function 
learning.  Indeed, many real-world artifacts produce outcomes that are harder to observe (e.g. 
collecting dust or drying hair) and are presumably harder to learn. 
In a similar vein, it could be argued that our function test was more difficult than the 
tests for actions and words.  For actions and words, the presentation at test matched the 
presentation during the exposure session.  The word ‘koba’ was spoken by the experimenter 
during the exposure session and at test.  Similarly, the same action was produced at both 
exposure and test (albeit a pantomime of the action at test).  In contrast, in the function test 
participants were not presented with the function they had witnessed during the exposure 
session (e.g., they did not observe the box playing the music).  Instead, the function was 
described verbally (e.g., “Which one starts the music playing?”) and children had to make the 
link between this description and the target artifact’s inferred function.  We did this so that 
the substrate was absent during testing.  In this way, we could be sure that target artifact 
selection was based upon retention of the function-artifact mapping and not just an 
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association between the substrate and the target artifact (see the Introduction for a discussion 
of this point).  
However, despite the relative difficulty of the function test question, children did 
demonstrate impressive rates of retention of the function-artifact mapping in Experiment 1.  
The retention of function was above chance levels, and not significantly different from 
retention of actions or words – strongly suggesting that participants were able to understand 
the function test question.  That is, they were able to link the question’s description of the 
function (…starts the music playing…) to the function they had encoded.  This in turn 
suggests that when children failed the function test in Experiment 2, they did so because they 
had failed to retain the function-artifact mapping, and not because they did not understand the 
question. 
Interpretation of results 
Having addressed the methodological aspects of our study, we now turn our attention to 
interpreting the results.  Preschoolers can fast map and retain a link between a novel artifact 
and its novel action, its novel function and its novel name at rates well above chance 
(Experiment 1). These results provide further evidence that fast mapping and retention 
extends beyond words, supporting Bloom’s (2000) claim that fast mapping is a domain-
general process.  In addition, our data suggest that (i) preschool children can fast map 
functions and actions when they incidentally observe a novel artifact being used for the first 
time (Experiment 1), and (ii) they have a particular proclivity for learning action-artifact 
mappings (Experiments 2 and 3). We now expand on both of these points in turn. 
First, early research on the fast mapping of words suggested that it is a robust 
phenomenon, which leads to good performance on comprehension tests following a delay 
(e.g., Goodman, McDonough & Brown, 1998; Heibeck & Markman, 1987; Markson & 
Bloom, 1997; Woodward, Markman & Fitzsimmons, 1994).  However, more recent data has 
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suggested that long-term retention of a novel name is poor, without the addition of memory 
aids during the exposure session (Horst & Samuelson, 2008; Vlach & Sandhofer, 2012).  
Thus, fast mapping (with retention) is poor, unless the conditions are right.  Our data suggest 
that observing how a novel artifact is used, as opposed to merely being shown a novel object, 
may be one way to provide the right conditions for fast mapping and retention.  One 
hypothesis, based on these findings, is that preschoolers are particularly likely to engage in 
fast mapping and retention when observing a novel artifact being acted upon and its 
consequential function revealed.  We suggest that preschoolers may be drawn to learning 
when artifact use is demonstrated and that this benefits the learning of the artifact’s name, as 
well as its action and function information. 
Second, actions were retained after a week’s delay from just one exposure, when word 
(and function) retention fell to chance levels.  Most participants were even able to reproduce 
actions accurately after a week’s delay (from just two incidental exposures).  In contrast, not 
one child could articulate the new word, despite the impressive rates of word learning almost 
every child displays in life – by the age of eighteen years the average vocabulary is 60,000 
words (Bloom & Markson, 1998).  Clearly, children are excellent learners of words, but it 
would appear that they are even better learners of actions.  The tougher the test of learning, 
the more children’s learning of actions stood out. 
Why would action learning, in a fast mapping context, exceed learning of words and 
functions?  One possibility is that actions simply contain less information, and are therefore 
easier for children to learn.  Certainly, saying a word is more demanding than making many 
actions.  A word is a rapidly produced sequence of specific sounds – produced by the 
coordination of largely unseen body parts.  These factors would certainly help explain why 
action production exceeded word production in Experiment 3.  They may also explain the 
superior action comprehension evidenced in Experiment 2.  That words are more complex 
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than actions may make them harder for children to recognize as well as recall.  As previously 
noted, functions are more complex than actions as well.  
Our findings here are also consistent with the various theories of action imitation that 
argue that imitation is automatic – for example, Associative Sequence Learning (Heyes & 
Ray, 2000) and Hebbian learning (Keysers & Perrett, 2004).  These theories posit that when 
we see an action, the activation of a perceptual representation of this action produces at least 
some activation of the corresponding motor representation.   There is convincing evidence 
that action imitation is automatic in preschool children (e.g. Diamond & Taylor, 1996; 
Simpson & Riggs, 2011).  In contrast, recent data suggest that verbal imitation is not 
automatic (Simpson & Carroll, 2014; Simpson, Cooper, Gillmeister & Riggs, 2013).  Indeed, 
based on the greater automaticity of action imitation over verbal imitation, it has been argued 
that preschoolers may learn to produce actions more easily than words (Simpson et al., 2013).  
These authors argued that merely seeing an action creates a motor output representation of 
that action, whereas hearing a word does not create a motor output representation of the 
word. Following perception of the action or word, preschoolers are thus able to produce the 
action (using the automatically generated motor representation) but not the word.  The 
evidence presented here, that children can produce actions so much better than words 
following minimal exposure, is consistent with this proposal. 
More broadly, our findings are consistent with embodied cognition, which suggests that 
conceptual knowledge develops from action (see Marshall, 2016, and Shapiro, 2011, for 
reviews).  Our data suggest that children may learn the actions associated with a novel 
artifact the first time they see it used, and that function knowledge is only added to these 
representations following additional exposure. 
 
 




This study provides the first evidence that preschoolers fast map and retain both actions 
and functions, when they observe a novel artifact being used. The data suggest that observing 
an artifact being used may provide an effective context for fast mapping and retention.  This 
study also evidences that children can reproduce actions after a delay of at least a week 
following minimal and incidental exposure.  Our data suggest that preschoolers have a 
particular proclivity for learning artifact-action mappings.  This advantage is consistent with 
the long-standing proposal that early knowledge development makes particular use of 
sensorimotor processes (e.g., Piaget & Inhelder, 1969; Rakison & Woodward, 2008): with the 
artifact-action mapping the first to form.   
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